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Ironically, this limited ability to diagnose ‘relative’ risks and rewards is further exacerbated by the diminishing technical capability of the state: a negative mirror to Amazon’s flywheel model for amplifying capability. It is also increasingly difficult to carry out effective impact assessments where the (overstressed) benefits are relatively narrow and short-termist, while the downsides of technological adoption are diffuse and likely to only emerge after a significant time lag. Perhaps the universalist techno-utopian framing (cost savings and efficiency and economic growth and better health and new service offerings, etc.) means it is increasingly hard to distinguish the specific merits of different digitalisation options – and the commercial interests that actively hype them. Limited capability, difficult assessments, and dependency risk There is rarely co-creation of solutions, but too often a capture of procurement expenditure by entrepreneurs. This results in a situation where procurement best practices such as market engagement result in the ‘art of the possible’ being determined by private industry. However, this can also generate further space for capture, as the same lack of capability that affects high(er) level policymaking also affects funding organisations and ‘street level’ procurement teams. there are many proponents of that approach, such as Mazzucato, as discussed here). This also trickles down to procurement, as the ‘purchasing’ of digital technologies with public money is seen as a (not very subtle) way of subsidising their development (nb. Given the closer alignment (or political meddling?) of policymakers with eg research funding programmes, including but not limited to academic institutions, naïve or captured approaches impact other areas of ‘support’ for the development of digital technologies. Some of that over-optimism stems from limited public sector capability to understand the technologies themselves (as well as their implications), which leads to naïve or captured approaches to policymaking (on capture, see the eye-watering account emerging from the #Uberfiles). In other words, there are very few countries ready to move past signalling a willingness to jump onto the digital tech bandwagon.
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A relatively recent analysis showed that European countries (including the UK) underperform particularly in relation to strategic aspects that require detailed work (see graph). However, there seems to be a big (and growing?) gap between what countries report (or pretend) to be doing (eg in reports to the OECD AI observatory, or in relation to any other AI readiness ranking) and what they are practically doing. There is also a rush to ‘look digitally advanced’ eg through the formulation of ‘AI strategies’ that are unlikely to generate significant practical impacts (more on that below). There is a generalised over-optimism about the potential of digital technologies, as well as their likely impact on economic growth and international competitiveness. In this blog post, we reflect on the problematic compound effects of technology hype cycles and diminished public sector digital technology capability, paying particular attention to their impact on public procurement. By Albert Sanchez-Graells ( and Michael Lewis ( public sector’s reaction to digital technologies and the associated regulatory and governance challenges is difficult to map, but there are some general trends that seem worrisome.